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IS NATURALISM IRRATIONAL? 
J. Wesley Robbins 
Alvin Plantinga's epistemological argument in the last chapter of Warrant 
and Proper Function, to the effect that it is self-defeatingly irrational to 
believe the combination of naturalism and evolutionary theory, is seriously 
flawed. It presupposes that beliefs are subjective states intrinsically specifiable 
without reference to what is going on in the world around their holders. Evolu-
tionary naturalists, most notably pragmatists, who reject that conception of be-
liefs in favor of a holistic one, are untouched by Plantinga's argument. 
Alvin Plantinga titles the closing chapter of his book Warrant and Proper 
Function "Is Naturalism Irrational?"l He answers that it is. More precisely, 
he claims that anyone who is aware of the epistemological argument that he 
presents in this chapter has an unavoidable reason to doubt the combination 
of naturalism (according to which there is no God as conceived of in tradi-
tional theism) and evolutionary theory (according to which our cognitive 
capabilities are the products of blind processes operating on genetic vari-
ations). But then, he says, anyone who still accepts these propositions is 
irrational because it is irrational to accept a belief for which one knows there 
are unavoidable reasons to doubt. 
More generally, Planting a suggests that people who believe in naturalism 
and evolutionary theory are propelled in the direction of skepticism by those 
very beliefs. Whereas theists, in contrast, supposedly have no such skeptical 
trajectory built into their beliefs. There is nothing in what theists believe, so 
Plantinga says, that would lead them to doubt either that our cognitive ca-
pacities are for apprehending truth or that by and large they do so. 
I believe in both naturalism and evolution as Plantinga describes them. I 
am also aware of his epistemological argument, having heard him present a 
version of it and having discussed it with him during a series of meetings 
with philosophy students and faculty at Indiana University South Bend. I am, 
thus, a prime candidate for his charge of irrationality. 
Nonetheless, I demur. Plantinga's epistemological argument poses a prob-
lem, at most, only for a certain sort of evolutionary naturalist. There is another 
sort to whom it does not apply at all. 
The skeptical trajectory that Plantinga attributes to evolutionary naturalism 
actually is a function of the philosophical conception of beliefs as subjective 
states that are intrinsically specifiable without reference to what is going on 
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in the rest of the world. This is a conception which Plantinga shares with 
some, but not all, evolutionary naturalists. The cure for skeptical doubts about 
the reliability of our cognitive capabilities is to resist this conception of what 
beliefs are, not to replace naturalism with theism, as Plantinga suggests. 
Taking this cure requires only that one repudiate claims, made in the name 
of the epistemic primacy of the subjective, that the philosophical conception 
of beliefs is entitled to priority over our common sense notion of beliefs as 
holistic states that are specifiable only in connection with their subject's 
surroundings. 
This is the tack that pragmatists from Peirce to Rorty take in their accounts 
of human intelligence. Influenced by Darwin, pragmatists construe beliefs as 
transactional states between organisms and their environment which, like any 
other organic state understood in evolutionary terms, can only be specified 
and understood with reference to their possessor's surroundings. The result 
is a version of evolutionary naturalism that is untouched by Plantinga's epis-
temological argument. 
Plantinga puts his argument in terms of the probability of the proposition 
that our cognitive capabilities are reliable, and thus produce largely true 
beliefs, given naturalism, a theory of evolution, and a list of those capabili-
ties. In order to ascertain this probability, he sketches a series of five scenarios 
featuring hypothetical creatures whose cognitive capabilities were formed by 
blindly operating evolutionary forces. Plantinga's hypothetical creatures have 
beliefs. But, their beliefs are respectively (1) not causally connected with 
their behavior at all; (2) causally connected with their behavior, but only as 
effects of it or of other proximate causes; (3) causally connected with their 
behavior, but only in virtue of the beliefs' physical realization and not their 
content; (4) causally connected with their behavior in virtue of both physical 
realization and content, but maladaptive; and (5) causally connected and 
adaptive in systems, indefinitely many different ones of which can produce 
the same behavior. 
Plantinga assigns a probability to the proposition that these creatures' cog-
nitive capabilities are reliable, and thus their beliefs largely true, for each of 
these possibilities. The probability that their cognitive capabilities are reli-
able, and their beliefs largely true, overall, given naturalism and evolutionary 
theory, then, is the combination of the probabilities for each of these possi-
bilities. This latter probability, Plantinga claims, is either low or unknown. 
Since, Plantinga argues, we might be the creatures in these scenarios, the 
probability that our cognitive capabilities are reliable and that our beliefs are 
largely true, given naturalism and evolutionary theory, is also either low or 
unknown. Thus, evolutionary naturalists must admit that, for all that we know 
about the reliability of our cognitive capabilities, any belief of ours stands a 
good chance of being false, including our beliefs in naturalism and evolu-
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tionary theory, respectively. Evolutionary naturalism, Plantinga concludes, is 
self-defeating. Its adherents are caught in the epistemologically irrational 
circle of accepting beliefs about the truth of which they have reason to be 
doubtful by their own lights. 
Plantinga wants his evolutionary naturalist opponents to focus with him on 
the probabilities of the five possibilities that he outlines, accepting without 
question the belief-entities that figure in those scenarios. I want, instead, to 
focus on the belief-entities that Plantinga ascribes to his hypothetical crea-
tures and, by extension, to us. It is a crucial presupposition for all five of 
Plantinga's scenarios that beliefs, and their experiential grounds, are specifi-
able intrinsically, without reference to what is going on in the world around 
whomever holds the belief. Consequently, it is possible for someone's beliefs 
and what is going on in the world around them to vary in complete independence 
of one another and thus for their beliefs to be largely and wildly false. 
That certainly is not the case with the beliefs that we commonly ascribe to 
one another. Nor is it how people who are influenced by Darwinian biology 
view beliefs. When we ascribe beliefs to one another, we typically do so by 
correlating what we say and do with what is going on in the surrounding 
environment. Pragmatists, influenced by Darwin, follow the same course. 
Human intelligence and its products, including beliefs, are treated as states 
that are located in causal interactions between organisms and their surround-
ing environment, as habits of action, for example. 
It is not possible in either instance, whether viewed commonsensically or 
in Darwinian terms, for beliefs to vary independently of their subject's sur-
roundings, and thus be largely false, in the ways that Plantinga's scenarios 
presuppose. Consequently, for those of us who view beliefs in this holistic 
way, the scenarios over which the probabilities that Plantinga wants to talk 
about range are not even possibilities in the first place and thus pose no 
epistemological problem worth taking seriously. 
Plantinga claims that the entities he ascribes to his hypothetical creatures 
are appropriate for a critique of naturalism because they are the very things 
that are true or false. But, that all depends. They are the things that philoso-
phers since Descartes, who posit the independent knowability of subjective 
states, insist on calling true or false. They are not the things that we consider 
to be true or false in our day-to-day dealings with one another, where the 
philosophical posit of independently knowable subjective states plays no role. 
Nor are they the things that philosophers who look at human intelligence in 
Darwinian terms, and in whose accounts that posit also plays no role, consider 
to be true or false. It is sheer bravado on Plantinga's part to claim that naturalists 
have no alternative but to accept his notion of beliefs as intrinsic states. 
Consequently, the fact, if it is a fact, that the likelihood of Plantinga's 
hypothetical creatures' "beliefs" being largely true is either low or unknown 
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is supremely irrelevant to questions about the reliability of our cognitive 
capabilities and the truth or falsity of our beliefs. This is not because what 
those poor creatures believe is so very different from what we believe. It is 
because they don't have beliefs. Whatever may be the case about the variation 
of their intrinsically specifiable states from their environment, that simply 
does not translate over to the holistically specifiable states that we ascribe to 
one another in our dealings with fellow humans and other animals. 
Plantinga's epistemological argument against naturalism is severely limited 
in its scope to only those naturalists who happen to agree with him that beliefs 
are intrinsically specifiable states. There are such naturalists. Willard van 
Orman Quine, for example, treats beliefs as posits based on the irradiations 
of one's nerve endings, and the latter, since it is one's ultimate evidence, as 
specifiable independently of what is going on in the surrounding world. 
But there are other naturalists who part company with modern philosophi-
cal epistemology in this respect. Donald Davidson and Richard Rorty, for 
example, both reject what Davidson calls the dualism of scheme and content 
and with it the whole idea that the ultimate evidence for one's beliefs, along 
with the beliefs themselves, are intrinsically specifiable without reference to 
their subject's surroundings. Plantinga's epistemological argument doesn't 
even touch naturalists of this latter sort. 
Plantinga's argument has neither the power nor the scope that he supposes 
it to have. I remain a believer in both naturalism and evolutionary theory, 
having heard and reflected on Plantinga's epistemological argument. On my 
view of beliefs, none of his scenarios in which "beliefs" are liable to be 
completely at variance with what is going on in the world around their holder, 
and thus largely false, is even possible in the first place. 
When I consider the usefulness of beliefs holistically conceived for pre-
dicting behavior in everyday, and scientific, contexts and for avoiding philo-
sophical problems about knowledge of the external world, I am not even 
tempted to take Plantinga's scenarios or his labyrinthine musings about their 
likelihood seriously. Consequently, my acceptance of evolutionary naturalism 
flies in the face of no considerations that have any intellectual purchase for 
me, or that I am under any epistemic obligation to accept, Plantinga to the 
contrary notwithstanding. 
There are two morals to this story. First, starting with the intrinsic specifi-
ability and thus the independent knowability of subjective states, including 
beliefs, leads inexorably to skepticism about the external world regardless, 
whether one is a theist or a devotee of the Great Pumpkin. Second, episte-
mology is a poor choice of subject matters in terms of which to weigh the 
respective merits of naturalism and theism. 
Indiana University 
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